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REMEDIES OF ILLEGAL TAXATION.
TAXATION is to a nation what the circulation of the blood is to
he 'individual; absolutely essential to life. In ordinary times it is
the chief burden which government imposes upon the people, and
is likely, therefore, to be the greatest souice of discontent. This
renders it of the utmost importance that taxation should as nearly
as possible be just- and also that it should appear to those who pay
it to be just.' .-Absolute justice, however, is unattainable.
The primary purpose of ll''axaion is to produce revenue for
the various needs, of government, but indirect benefits may also be
accomplished by the levies.. A consideration of these often determines wha taxe shall 'be li!.id One state .taxes all land according
to'market vdlue," another deducts the value of improvements in
order to encourag the making of improvements, another taxes
only the property from which an income is derived, another
taxes the indc6m6'itself, ani-d'so'on. Indirect taxes' have almost
always some ulterior purpose: iiianufactured articles when imported
"are taxed that the domestic manufacturer m'ay to that extent have
an advantage over the foreign, and some kinds of busin'ess are
taxed heavily in order to discdurage them because of the attendant
evils: V"eazie Bank v. .enno, 8 Wall. 533; Youngblood v. Sexton,' 32 Mich. i06:' "The field of legislative discretion here is
unlimited, and in the selection of subjects for taxation the lawmaking power may 'be altogether arbitrary. All that can be
required is that 'a rule of apportionment shall be prescribed"which,
as between those subjects, shall'make its demands with equality.
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Whatever rule is prescribed, however, must be committed to lochl
agents for execution, and it is found that not only are these agents
many times careless and ignorant, but there are often local or class
reasons why they are not likely to administer the statutory rules
fairly. Thus, if property is taxed upon a valuation, and the local
values are assessed by local officers, and the state burdens apportioned according to these, each assessor may seek to cemmend
himself to his constituency by making his assessments as low as
possible, thereby reducing their relative proportion of the general
burden. So if the homestead of the laborer and the bonds of the
capitalist are to be taxed at the same rate, the officer, more carefu:
of his popularity than of his official oath, may seek by unfair
relative assessments to please the stronger party, and thereby perpetuate his hold. on public life. The prejudices of assessors against
classes of men or particular accumulations of property are often as
efficient in producing inequalities in taxation as the desire for
political favor; and wherever there is opportunity for it-as there is
in abundance in the levy and collection of imposts and excises---corruption in various forms must be looked for and guarded against. In
the last-mentioned cases the government itself is the party cheated,
but in other cases the wrong in general is a wrong to taxpayers.
Where the evil which the taxpayer feels is in the law itself, inthat it selects the subjects of taxation. unfairly, the only remedy
available is the political remedy: Veazie Bank v. Penno, 8 Wall.
533, 548 ; State v. Newark; 26 N. J. 519; Kirby v. Shaw, 19
Penn. St. 258; Williams v. Cammaek, 27 Miss. 209, 219; Coite
v. Society for Savings, 32 Conn. 173; Watson v. -Princeton,4
Met. 599, 602. The legislature has its sphere of action, which
includes this whole subject, and the judiciary cannot enter it. But
important restraints may be and sometimes are placed upon the
legislature by the constitution, and when this is foumd to be the
ease, the judiciary may be called upon to see that they are observed.
For example, the constitution may require the legislature to make
laws for the taxation of all property by value; and then no
exemptions can be made: Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County,
21 Iowa 221; Fletcherv. Oliver, 25 Ark. 289; People v. MeCreery.
34 Cal. 432 ; Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 Ill. 146 ; Primm v. Belle
ville, 59 Ill. 142; Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273; Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio N. S. 1; Louisgville, &c., Railroad Co. v.
State, 8 1'eisk. 664. Or it may exempt property used for specified
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purposes, such as schools, public worship, &c., and thereby remove
it altogether from the reach of the taxing power so long as the
constitution remains unchanged; and by implication of law all
property selected, owned and used by either state or federal government as a necessary or convenient means to the exercise of its
functions is exempted from the taxing power of the other (M7cCulloc v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; The Collector v. -Day, 11 Wall.
113; United States v. Bailroad Co., 17 Id. 322), as are also the
public loans, and other means whereby the government is enabled
to perform its constitutional duties and perpetuate its powers
unimpaired: Weston v. Charleston,2 Pet. 449; Crandallv. 1XTvada,
6 Wall. 35.
Any tax is illegal which is levied for a purpose the burden of
which cannot lawfully be thrown upon the public: Loan Association
v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655. So if the statute undertakes to provide
for the levy of a tax which the constitution forbids, the tax is
illegal, for the constitution is the law for the case and overrules any
conflicting law: People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. Rep. 539. A tax
may also be illegal merely because in its assessment or levy the
forms of law have failed of observance through the ignorance or
inadvertence of officers, or because of intentional disobedience to
the law. Where the only ground for contesting the enforcement
of the tax is that irregularities have occurred, the defects ought to
be such as injuriously affect the interest of the taxpayer, or the tax
should be sustained. It is so difficult to insure absolute correctness
in tax proceedings, that a failure to follow closely the merely
directory requirements of the statute may well be overlooked when
nobody is injured by the errors: Picket v. Allen, 10 Conn. 145;
Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. 418 ; Goodiin v. Perkins. 39 Vt. 598 ;
Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228 ; State v. Commissioners,29 Md.
516; Harrison County Commissioners v. XcLarql, 27 Ind. 475.
But it is a familiar fact in the law, that there are some forms and
formal proceedings which can never be dispensed with, because
they are of the very essence of taxation, and without them the tax
would be only an arbitrary exaction, measured by the discretion of
the revenue officers. One of these is, an apportionment between
the subjects of taxation within the taxing district with a view to
uniformity. The rate of apportionment must be prescribed by law,
and every taxpayer has a right to require that it be followed. If
he be taxed at one rate, and his neighbor at another and a less
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rate, the tax as to him is void: Tide Water (o. v. Coster, 18 N.
J. Eq. 518; O'Kane v. Treat, 25 111. 557; Lexington v. MeQuillan, 9 Dana 513. So if the law provides for an opportunity
to the taxpayer to be heard in respect to his assessment, and foi
notice of the time and place, the failure to give the notice is not a
mere'irregularity, but is fatal: In Matter of Smith, 52 N. Y. 526 ;
Moulton v. Blaisdell, 24 Me. 283; Lagroue v. Rains, 48 Mo.
536 ; .Dool v. (assopolis, 4 N. W. Rep. 265. The same is true of
the failure to give notice and an opportunity to be heard in any
appellato tribunal, after an appeal from the assessment has been
taken: -Darlingv. Gnnn, 50 Ill. 424; Railroad Co. v. Washington Co., 3 Neb. 30; &ewart v. Trevor, 56 Penn. St. 374; NYixon
v. Ruple, 30 N. J. 58. But if the party taxed applies for relief
in equity, and does not show or allege that he is unfairly taxed,
relief will be denied; Albany & Boston Mining Co. v. AuditorGeneral,87 Mich. 391.
But it is not our purpose at this time to discuss the general
subject of illegal taxation, and the remedies that are appropriate
to correct its evils. The space now at our command would not
admit of this; and, besides, it may be assumed that the general
rules are familiar. We shall only call attention to two or three
points to which recent facts have given prominence, and which
present unusual difficulties. These arise in the case of assessment
of property for taxation by value, which, in state taxation, is the
method by which the revenue is mostly raised.
The valuation of property implies an inquiry into the elements
of value, and the application to these of the judgment of the party
making it. The value, however, is not to be a speculative value,
and the judgment should not be based upon excellencies or defects,
real or fancied, which the assessor perceives but which are not
open to the observation of others. It should, on the other hand,
be a value which the community recognises, and which would
determine its sale if put upon the market. In other words, the
assessment should be according to the market value. But the
market value may be one thing or another according to the circumstances and terms of sale. It is one thing, at a forced sale, where
the property must go for what shall then by any one be bid for it;
it is another, when time can be taken and the opportunity for a
good sale awaited; it is one thing when immediate payment must
be made in full, and another when the circle of purchasers can be
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enlarged by allowing those to bid who must have credit for the
larger part of their purchase. What standard is chosen is- not
very important so long as it is uniformly maintained, but to preclude evasions it is sometimes provided that the cash value shall be
deemed to be, the value at sales as commonly made, and not what
the property would bring at a forced sale.
The value being based upon judgment, it has been generally
aeld that the assessor should be considered a judicial officer, and
therefore within the general rule that exempts this class of officers
from personal responsibility for erroneous judgments: Weaver v.
Devendorf, 8 Denio 117; Williams v. Weaver, 75 N. Y. 30, and
cases cited; Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 559; Pentland v. Stewart, 4 Dev. & Bat. 386; Macklot v. Davenvort, 17 Iowa 379;
Walker v. ifallock, 32 Ind. 239; Steam Navigation Co. v. Wasco
Co., 2 Or. 209; &tickney v. Bangor, 80 Me. 404; Huggins v.
Hinson, 1 Phil. (N. C,) 126. It may be doubtful if the rule of
exemption, as applied to their case, is not broader than it should
be. It seems to be assumed in New Hampshire that assessors are
only protected when their good faith is not successfully impeached
(Tyler v. Flanders,57 N. H. 618), and this would bring them
within the rule of responsibility which has often been applied to
other inferior officers who are charged with duties of a similar quasi
judicial character, such as directors of schools, judges of elections
and the like: State v. McDonald, 4 Harr. (Del.) 555; Goetchens
v. Matthewson, 61 N. Y. 420; Carter v. Barrison, 5 Blackf. 138;
Wheeler v. Patterson, 1 N. H. 88 ; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 S. &
R. 35; Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St. 151; Per7iter v. Tyler,
48 Vt. 444; Hoggatt v. Bigley, 6 Humph. 236; Donahoe v.
Richards, 38 Me. 379 ; Walker v. iallock, 32 Ind. 239 ; Gordon
v. Farrar,2 Doug. (Mich.) 411 ; Bevard v. .Hoffman, 18 Md. 479 ;
Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. 492; Caulfield v. Bullock, 18 B. Mon.
495; Pattersonv. D'Auterive, 6 La. Ann. 467; Pauslerv. Parsons, 6 W. Va. 486. Complete exemption invites and encourages
fraud; while on the other hand there is very little danger that an
assessor under any rule would be made responsible for errors in
an honest judgment. But we must take the rule as it stands upon
the authorities; and upon these it is undeniable that the judgment
of the assessor is not to be questioned, for either error or fraud, in
an action against him personally.
If, therefore, the assessor value the property of any taxpayer rela-
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tively too high, and this is the only complaint made of the assessment, the party assessed must look for his remedy elsewhere than tG
a suit against the assessor. The assessment-roll will not disclose the
inequality on its face, but will apparently be in compliance with
the law, and therefore apparently just and lawful. The assessor
will certify that he has made the assessment according to his judgment of values, and in his favor the law must conclusively presume
that he has done so. Even where he has erroneously charged the
axpayer with property not liable to taxation, the presumption
must be the same: Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N. Y. 238; Huggins
v. Hinson, 1 Phil. (N. C.) 126; Williams v. Weaver, 100 U. S.
Rep. 547. And so it must be if he has omitted to assess property
of others that should be taxed; thereby increasing contrary to the
intent of the law the burdens of those who are assessed: Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 559.
But though in favor of a judge it must in civil cases be presumed that his official action is the result of his honest opinion,
it does not always follow that the judgment must be paid. In
equity relief may be had even against the judgments of courts of
record, when, by reason of fraud, accident, or mistake in one or
more of the parties it is unjust, and not such a judgment as but
for that circumstance it must be presumed the court would have
made it: Freeman on Judgments, c. xxii.; United States v.
Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61. It is true that such a proceeding
does not assail the personal integrity or good faith of the judge;
but this may be done in a direct prosecution by impeachment;
and in the case of an officer who is only quasi judge, and not
subject to such a prosecution, there is no reason why the direct
proceeding to set aside his action on the ground that it was
dictated by malice or fraud, should not be permitted.
It has accordingly been held that where, instead of valuing all
property by the same standard, the assessor had purposely and
fraudulently made an individual assessment relatively higher than
that of others, it was within the ordinary powers of a court of
equity to give relief against the fraud by restraining the collection
of the tax so far as it should be equitable to do so: Chicago v.
Burtice, 24 Ill. 489; Paczftc Hotel Go. v. Lieb, 83 Id. 602;
Merrill v. Humphrey, 24 Mich. 170; Lefferts v. Calumet, 21
Wis. 688; Frazerv. Siebern, 16 Ohio (N. S.) 614.' It is not often
I For the general principles on which the collection of unequal assessments will
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that such a fraud can be established by the declarations of the party
himself who is chargeable with it, but it may be made out on circumstances as in other cases. Very properly the courts impose the condition to relief that the complainant shall do equity; and equity in
the case of an excessive assessment would consist in paying what
the party assessed would have paid had the assessment been relatively just and fair.' A like rule to this is applied when equity
sets aside a fraudulent or otherwise unjust judgment: Freeman on
Judgments, sect. 516. This principle, which is a perfectly equitable one, has perhaps not been applied as often as it should have
been, especially in the case of corporations which are taxed excessively, either by reason of errors in the statutes or of mistakes of
judgment in assessors. National banks, for example, under the
laws of Congress, can only be taxed by the states according to
standards which Congress presents, and it has sometimes been
found that the state laws either prescribed a different standard, or
failed to make any provision under which taxation by the congressional standard was practicable. Any assessment whatever under
such circumstances must be void, since lawful taxation must be
based upon positive law prescribing its conditions and methods:
Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; Bradley v. People, 4 Id.
459. But when a state law merely taxes the banks excessively,
by reason of some discrimination which it makes against them,
there is no good reason why they should not pay such taxes as are
equitably and lawfully assessable: Merchants' National Bank v.
Gummzing, 17 Alb. Law Jour. 345 (U. S. Circuit, Ohio); National
Bank of Paducah v. Paducah, 5 Cent. Law Jour. 347 (U. S.
Circuit, Ky.).
Perhaps in the majority of cases an excessive assessment affects
not single individuals but whole classes; as for example, when nonresidents are unequally assessed upon unseated or unimproved
lands. If this is done fraudulently and upon system, so that each
item"of property is over-assessed the same percentage, perhaps all
be enjoined, see State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. Rep. 575; Du Page v. Jenks,
65 II. 275; Albany 4- Boston Mining Co. v. Auditor-General, 37 Mich. 391 .
Cedar Rapids, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Carroll Co., 41 Iowa 153; 3ilwaukee Iron Co.
r. Hubbard29 Wis. 51 ; Parnley v. Railroad Co., 3 Dill. 25.
See cases cited in last note. Also, Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb, 81 Ill. 556;
Harr son v. Haas, 25 Ind. 281 ; Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa 271 ; Twomby v.
Kunibrough, 24 Ark. 459 ; Adams Y. Castle, 30 Conn. 404 ; Lawrence v. Killam,
11 Kans. 499; Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush 406.
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parties concerned might unite in a, bill in equity to restrain the
collection of the excessive tax ;' but this is at least questionable.
There must necessarily be an inquiry into the excess in each case;
and the fact that the illegal intent was the same as to all could not
be evidence that all bad been equally wronged. The law may well
presume that an officer has performed his duty; but when his jurpose is to depart from rectitude, and abandon the rule of law for
one arbitrarily fixed by himself, there can be no intendment that
he has been true to his dishonest purpose. It would seem therefore, that every man's case would stand upon its own merits, and
the question would be, not how great was the wrong intended, but
how great was the wrong accomplished.
But the taxpayer may have the same right to complain of the
fraudulent undervaluation of others that he has to find fault-with
the excessive valuation of his own property, for the effect in increasing his tax is the same in each case. It has often been held that a
legal wrong is committed when property is exempted from assessment without authority of law; but the remedy may be different
in different cases according to the circumstances. If the exemptions are so large as sensibly to affect the amount of the tax levied
upon each individual person or item of property, perhaps the whole
roll ought to be declared void. See Henry v. Chester, 15 Yt. 460;
Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; State v. Branin, 23 N. J.
484; Crosby v. Lyon, 37 Cal. 242; Page v. St. Louis, 20 Mo.
136; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill 883. But to annul a tax
roll for the year is a severe remedy, and is so liable to breed confusion in public affairs that it ought never to be granted on the
complaint of individuals, and as a means of righting individual
wrongs, unless justice is otherwise likely to fail. The better remedy would seem to be, to allow the individual assessments to be
abated in equity, or to permit the parties paying taxes to recover
back at law what they pay in excess of their just proportion. See

Watson v. Princeton,4 Met. 599; Muscatine v. Railroad Co., 1

Dillon 536; Primm v. Belleville, 59 III. 142; Ottawa v. Barney,
10 Kans. 270; Tobey y. Wareham, 2 Allen 594. But still better
would be proper statutory provisions under which not only would
the tax roll be sustained, but also the individual assessments, and
I That the general rule permits this.wheu. all are affected alike and equally, se
Cooley on Taxation 546 ; High on Injunction J 748.
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the property unlawfully exempted would be specially taxed on a
separate roll, or be taxed for two years on the roll for the following
year.
Questions even more troublesome arise when the assessors, in
defiance of law, either overvalue or undervalue all the property of
the taxing district, for some purpose which cannot be avowed and
which is a fraud upon the law. Instances of over-valuation have
not often occurred, for the reason that the inducements to evasion
of law more often lead the officers in the opposite direction. There
have, however, been some cases where, in order to evade statutory
or constitutional provisions limiting the authority of municipal
bodies in raising money for local purposes to a low percentage on
the total assessments, the local officers have purposely made the
assessment largely above the real value of property. This is a
case of fraud upon the municipality, and if there be a prompt resort
to legal proceedings -before the rights of third parties intervene,
there should be no difficulty in enjoining the contracting of debts
or the payment of money for local improvements, based upon and
measured by the excessive and fraudulent roll. But such things
are done, when done at all, under the pressure of a temporary and
unreasoning excitement, and the time for questioning them commonly passes by before the sober second thought of the people
opens their eyes to the crime of their officers and their own folly.
Wherever there are systematic under-valuations, it generally
appears, on examination, that the assessors have deliberately fixed
upon a percentage of the true value as that which, in making
their roll, they will adopt as the true value for their purposes.
For example, when the law requires them to assess as the true cash
value, and they make oath that they will perform their duty under
the law, they nevertheless decide in their own minds that they will
assess at one-third the value only. One curious feature about
these assessments is, that though there can be no reason whatever
for adopting an illegal standard except to prevent the respective
municipalities obtaining the advantage of each other in the apportionment of state or county taxes, yet it is sometimes the case
that, by common consent, they agree with each other what shall
be the rate of assessment, and exactly how far they will depart
from the law; in that case accomplishing nothing whatever by
their disregard of solemn oaths, since an honest estimate would
have placed them all relatively in the same position. But in some
VOL. XXIX.-2
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states such a purpose to disobey the law has been deliberately
acted upon for years without any very earnest attempt to restrain
it, except by some statutory changes to which little or no attention
has been paid. The chief reason for the toleration has been that
no -one could' say that he was personally injured by the official
dishonesty, and it is always an ungracious task for a private citizen
to take upon himself the redress of public wrongs. Indeed the
general public 'has scarcely felt the wrong, for very few ever
appreciate or, reflect upon the corrupting and, demoralizing effect
of an habitual disregard of law by officers sworn to obey it. Nor
is redress easy'; for, as the law is violated in the supposed interest
of the 'local community, it is natural to expect a local sentiment
that will go far to shield them in case of prosecution. In Wisconsin, where the statute requires the assessors to assess
lands "from actual view, at the full value which could ordinarily
be obtained therefor at private sale, and which the assessor bshall
believe that the ,owner, if he desires to sell, would accept in full
payment," it has been held that an assessment of all the cultivated
lands of a county at one uniform rate, all the timbered land from
which the timber had been removed at another uniform rate, all
the pine lands 'on first-class driving streams within two miles'
hauling at another uniform rate, and so on, was invalid, and any
person assessed might maintain a bill to enjoin the collection of a
tax based thereon: Hersey v. Supervisors of Barron, 37 Wis. 75.
(See Thomas v. Gain, 85 Mich. 155.) So, where a statute required
the assessment - for- a local improvement to be made in proportion
to the actual benefits, estimated by the officers on actual view, and
instead of that it was made by them in proportion to :the cost of
the' improvement irrespective of the benefits, it was held that any
contract based upon such assessment was unwarranted and illegal:
Johnson v. Milwaukee, 40 Wis. 315. But a more important and
far-reaching decision was that which declared that equity would
interfere and restrain the collection of a tax based upon a uniform
and intentional assessment of property in the taxing district,
when the statute required it to be at the full value which could
ordinarily be obtained for the property at private sale: Schettler v.
Fort Howard, 43 Wis. 49. We say far-reaching, because it is notorious that assessments in Wisconsin for many years have been made
in like'disregard of the law, until it had come to be understood
that the official oath was a mere form, to be taken that it might be
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broken. But it is an unquestionable truth that was uttered by
Mr. Justice COLE in that case, "There is really no security to the
taxpayer except in requiring assessors to perform their duty and
make assessments in substantial compliance with the law." And
as was said by the chief justice, "The question, I think, resolves
itself into this: whether statutory officers can, in the execution of
their office, wilfully disregard the safeguards of the statute which
creates their office; whether it is for the legislature to provide a
general and constitutional rule of assessment, and for assessors to set
the statute at defiance, and to establish, each for himself, several
and unconstitutional rules. * * It is very easy for assessors to be
honest in the discharge of their duties ; and if honest, their errors
of judgment can operate little to impair the uniform rule of the
constitution. If they should be suffered to substitute a rule of
their own for the rule of the statute, and yet to uphold their
assessments by an oath that they have followed the statutory rule,
it appears to me not extravagant to say that taxation in this state
would rest less upon a uniform rule of assessment than upon a
uniform rule of fraud and perjury. I am quite sure that no argument of inconvenience will ever induce this court to lend its
sanction to such deliberate fraud, perpetrated in the name and by
the authority of the state, in a proceeding which purports to be
a just and uniform exercise of a sovereign poifer."'
In Michigan similar questions have been raised, but under different circumstances.
The statute requires property to be assessedat its true cash value;
and that the assessor's certificate shall show the fact; and it has
always been held that the certificate will be void unless it shows
strict compliance: Olark v. Crane, 5 Mich. 151; Hogelskamp v.
Weeks, 37 Mich. 422; Wattles v. Lapeer, 40 Mich'' 24. But
this is a mere showing in words, while the fact is commonly otherwise. In one adjudged case a city 'which by its charter was restricted in the tax it might levy in any one year to one and onefourth per centum of the valuation, was found to have laid a tax
considerable more than two per centum of the assessment roll.
One of the taxpayers refused to make payment, and when suit was
brought against him it incidentally appeared that the valuation of
This case was followed in Salscheier v. Fort Howard, 45 Wis. 519.
Tierney v. Union Lunering Co., 2 N. W. Rep. 289.

And

see
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propei ty for the year had been arbitrarily fixed by the assessors at
one-fourth the cash value. It thus appeared that had a legal basis
for assessment been taken, the tax would have been far within
bounds; but the assessment had been made by the statute the
measure of the power to tax, and the assessors had made their
record and the city must abide by it. It followed that the tax was
void. Wattles v. Lapeer, 40 Mich. 624. (See Connors v. Detroit,
41 Mich. 128.)
In another case, in which the validity of a sale for taxes was the
subject of contention, it appeared that the certificate of the assessor
was in due form, and showed, if true, a legal valuation. But it
was proposed to show in opposition to that, that the certificate was
false, and the actual valuation was far below the cash value. The
court held that the evidence could not be received to defeat the tax
title. Referring to the Wisconsin cases, which were relied upon,
GRAVEs,*J., says: "They have been examined and are found not to
sustain the position now taken. Expressions are noticed in some
of them which, if wrested from the context, might possibly afford
some countenance to the claim here. But when they are considered
in connection with the issue presented, and the bias of the discussion, they cannot afford any aid. In every instance the contention
was between the proprietary and the public authorities, and the
action or suit, or whatever it should be called, was instituted or
maintained or carried on to annul or enjoin the alleged tax, ior
some kind of illegality of the public agents, and the issue was
directly upon the validity of the proceedings, and where consequently the matter of the proceedings could not be set up to prove
validity. Moreover the question was not only between the property holder and the public authorities who were seeking to fasten
a burden upon him, but it was raised seasonably and without laches,
and before the attaching of any right of third persons. It belonged
to the very object of the inquiry to see whether what purported to
be a lawful record was in truth one having the property of verity,
or whether it was invalid and not entitled to credence. There is a
striking analogy between such a proceeding and one by writ of
error or bill of review, and the distinction is well marked between
the right to impeach proceedings when so assailed and when attacked
collaterally and after the transaction has been closed and time has
run upon it and new rights have grown up on the faith of its rec.
titude. Every system of jurisprudence has recognised the princi
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ple, and it pervades the whole policy of our laws. Our revenue
code has always been shaped with reference to it. The case before
the court stands on entirely different ground. After the lapse of
more than twenty years from the sale, and after the deed had been
on record nearly that period, and after the holder of the tax title
had gone into possession and held for some time, the holder of the
original title began this action of ejectment, and he asserts therein
the right to do away with the sworn official certificate of the supervisor by his present recollection as a witness. There is no general
rule of law which will permit this to be done. On the contrary
the course of decision is opposed to it." Blanchard v. Powers, 4
N. W. Rep. 542.
Such are the decisions in these two states. In Wisconsin the
vigorous judicial denunciation of official dishonesty has no doubt
had good results, and changes have been made in the statutes to
facilitate the making of a re-assessment when the tax proves illegal :
(See Single v. Stettin, 6 N. W. Rep. 312.) In Michigan it is
highly probable that litigation in respect to these fraudulent
assessments has only jpust begun. (See Hogelskamp v. Weeks, 37
Mich. 422; Attorney-General v. Supervisors of Sanilac,3 N. W.
Rep. 260.)
The sytematic under-valuation of property at a certain percentage is not always applied to personalty, and indeed as to that we
find other evasions of law that sometimes operate one way and
sometimes another. If the statute undertakes to assess personal
property, including bonds, mortgages, corporate shares and other
monied capital, in gross, upon the judgment of the assessor, the
widest possible field is afforded for discretionary valuations, and for
fraudulent assessments; and the assessor's evasion of law may
take the form of an exemption of personalty, or of an excessive
valuation, according to the local desire. If the law undertakes to
tax all or nearly all personal property, it may be popular to overlook much of it, since few persons would be without something to
be taxed for, and the ordinary furnishing of the house of a man
of moderate means would constitute, when valued fairly, a very
considerable item. If, on the other hand, the law exempts household furniture, tools of trade, &c., from assessment, the personal
property to be taxed would consist largely in monied ,capital, and
the local feeling might run strongly in favor of assessing this as
highly as possible. Any careful examination of the tax statistics
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of different states must satisfy any one that in some a very large
proportion of the personal property which the statute intends shall
be taxed escapes assessment altogether, while in others it is probably assessed far beyond its fair proportion. This last is especially
true of such items of personal property as have a known and definite market value-such as corporate stocks and public securities.
The statutory methods which have been provided for protecting
personal property against excessive taxation have generally been
one or more of the following: 1. An appeal to some statutory
board which is clothed with power to hear complaints and make
abatements: Walker v. Cochran, 8 N. H. 166; State v. Parker,
34 N. J. 49; Otis Co. v. Ware, 8 Gray 509; State v. Ormsby
Co., 7 Nev. 892, and whose decision will be final: Rhoads v.
Cushman, 45 Ind. 85. 2. Allowing the taxpayer to furnish his
list of property and to verify it by his oath, and making this conclusive, except as the assessor shall be satisfied on investigation
that it is untrue. 3. Permitting the person assessed to reduce the
assessment after it has been made, by making oath that the whole
amount does not exceed a certain smaller sum which he names.
But neither of these is any protection as against the inequality
which is caused by a systematic under-valuation of real estate.
If a man actually owns $100,000 of personal estate, he cannot
honestly return it at $30,000, though he may know that real
estate is assessed at three-tenths its value only; neither if he is
assessed for $100,000 can he "swear it down" to $30,000, or
satisfy an appellate board that it amounts to that sum only. He
is in fact remediless in any of the methods which the tax laws provide, and he must submit in silence or resort to equity for relief.
Possibly, under the statutes of some states, there may be a remedy
by suit to recover any excess after the tax has been paid, but we
speak here of general principles only, and it is not perceived that
in equity the case instanced differs from that of the landowner
who is discriminated against by an assessment which is excessive
as compared with the lands of others. The ground for granting
him equitable relief is, that the assessment is fraudulent; that it
does not undertake to apportion the burden as the law commands,
and that as a consequence he is prejudiced by being compelled to
pay more than his legal and just proportion of the public taxes.
But when no such relative inequality can be shown, the question may be asked, why may not the assessor, nevertheless, be
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liable to civil actions by taxpayers for his systematic violation of
law and disregard of his official oath in his under-valuations ?
The difficulty in the way of such an action must lie in the fact
that the individual taxpayer can show no damage to his own
interests. If the relative valuations are all equally low, each will
pay no more than his just proportion of the tax. An actionable
wrong implies b,,tth an injury and a resulting damage; and here
app 'catly there is no damage whatever. And is there an individual injury ? If there is, an action may be sustained; tor the law
implies some damage from every distinct invasion of individual
right: Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938; -Embrey v. Owen,
6 Exch. 353; Webb v. Portland Co., 3 Sumn. 189; Dixon v.
Clow, 24 Wend. 191; Tillotson v. Smith, 32 N. H. 90; Tuthill
v. Scott, 43 Vt. 525; Tootle v. Clifton, 22 Ohio N. S. 247. But
when we say there is an invasion of individual right, it is implied
that the individual had a legal right which was personal to himself to insist upon some course of conduct different from that
which has been pursued, and that some duty owing to him as an
individual has been violated. Now, the general duty to obey the
laws, to observe official oaths and not to injure the community by
a public example of immorality is beyond all question a public
duty. A wrong done by a breach of it is a public wrong, and
ought to be redressed in a public prosecution. The fact that such
a prosecution is likely to be ineffectual, by reason of the general
disposition to wink at and even favor the breach of duty, cannot
change its nature, or give new remedies. If a court can see its
way clear to holding the whole tax roll void for the fraud, thereby
compelling a re-assessment, as has been done in Wisconsin, that
may solve the difficulty; otherwise it would seem that the fraudulent under-valuations may go on indefinitely, unless some appellate
board, selected from the state at large or from some large district,
shall be given authority adequate for a complete revision of the
work of the local officers. That there is abundant occasion for
prompt and decisive legislative interference would seem to be
unquegtionable.
In what has above been said respecting a remedy in equity, it is
assumed that no statute prohibits it. It is conceded that the
statute may prohibit injunction suits in tax cases: Pullan v.
Kinsin~qer, 2 Abb. U. S. 94; Howland v. Soule, Deady 413;
Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1; Lennon v. New York, 56 N.
Y. 361; or may attach conditions to their being brought: Braun

